Retreating from Afghanistan – a lesson from 1842

Ed note: Afghans remain fiercely independent, resenting control by any foreign power. Just ask the British, Russians and now the Americans. What’s historically been called “The Great Game” is entering a new, sad and treacherous chapter. Negotiations with the Taliban have positioned us to fail. The retreat seems abrupt and chaotic. Can the US Embassy remain functional? Can people be evacuated safely. Hopefully the past will not be replayed.

By Robert McNamara Updated December 06, 2019

A British incursion into Afghanistan ended in disaster in 1842 when an entire British army, while retreating back to India, was massacred. Only a single survivor made it back to British-held territory. It was assumed the Afghans let him live to tell the story of what had happened.

The background to the shocking military disaster had been the constant geopolitical jockeying in southern Asia which eventually came to be called “The Great Game.” The British Empire, in the early 19th century, ruled India (through the East India Company), and the Russian Empire, to the north, was suspected of having its own designs on India.

The British wanted to conquer Afghanistan to prevent the Russians from invading southward through the mountainous regions into British India.

One of the earliest eruptions in this epic struggle was the First Anglo-Afghan War, which had its beginning in the late 1830s. To protect its holdings in India, the British had allied themselves with an Afghan ruler, Dost Mohammed.

He had united warring Afghan factions after seizing power in 1818 and seemed to be serving a useful purpose to the British. But in 1837, it became apparent that Dost Mohammed was beginning a flirtation with the Russians.

Britain Invades Afghanistan

The British resolved to invade Afghanistan, and the Army of the Indus, a formidable force of more than 20,000 British and Indian troops, set off from India for Afghanistan in late 1838. After difficult travel through the mountain passes, the British reached Kabul in April 1839. They marched unopposed into the Afghan capital city.

Dost Mohammed was toppled as the Afghan leader, and the British installed Shah Shuja, who had been driven from power decades earlier. The original plan was to withdraw all the British troops, but Shah Shuja’s hold on power was shaky, so two brigades of British troops had to remain in Kabul.

Along with the British Army were two major figures assigned to essentially guide the government of Shah Shuja, Sir William McNaghten and Sir Alexander Burnes. The men were two well-known and very experienced political officers. Burnes had lived in Kabul previously, and had written a book about his time there.

The British forces staying in Kabul could have moved into an ancient fortress overlooking the city, but Shah Shuja believed that would make it look like the British were in control. Instead, the British built a new cantonment, or base, that would prove difficult to defend. Sir Alexander Burnes, feeling quite confident, lived outside the cantonment, in a house in Kabul.

The Afghans Revolt

The Afghan population deeply resented the British troops. Tensions slowly escalated, and despite warnings from friendly Afghans that an uprising was inevitable, the British were unprepared in November 1841 when an insurrection broke out in Kabul.

A mob encircled the house of Sir Alexander Burnes. The British diplomat tried to offer the crowd money to disburse, to no effect. The lightly defended residence was overrun. Burnes and his brother were both brutally murdered.

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1 Response to Retreating from Afghanistan – a lesson from 1842

  1. Frank Conlon says:

    Some years ago, shortly after 9/11, the conservative talk radio host and sometime state politician John Carlson had me on his program on KJR to discuss whether the US should go into Afghanistan. I said that, based on the history of such earlier entities as the Mongols, Persians, Uzbeks, British (from India) and Russians, it would be a very unwise decision to get involved in a war within Afghanistan. Carlson’s listeners–who were not accustomed to the idea that the US could not win a war anywhere, were outraged and they had so many calls, that what was to have been a 30 minute slot lasted for an hour and a half. Some commented on my “communist leanings” and one man suggested I go back where I came from–to which I explained that that would be Omaha. Alas, as we see the dreadful situation evolving in Afghanistan today, I have to confess I am afraid that my opinion twenty years ago did merit more consideration than it received.

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